Lightweight Specification Language and Verification Framework for Sensor Network Security Protocols by Hanna, Youssef Wasfy et al.
Computer Science Technical Reports Computer Science
11-14-2006
Lightweight Specification Language and
Verification Framework for Sensor Network
Security Protocols
Youssef Wasfy Hanna
Iowa State University, youssef.hanna@gmail.com
Hridesh Rajan
Iowa State University
Zhang Wensheng
Iowa State University, wzhang@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports
Part of the Programming Languages and Compilers Commons, and the Theory and Algorithms
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hanna, Youssef Wasfy; Rajan, Hridesh; and Wensheng, Zhang, "Lightweight Specification Language and Verification Framework for
Sensor Network Security Protocols" (2006). Computer Science Technical Reports. 250.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports/250
Lightweight Specification Language and Verification Framework for
Sensor Network Security Protocols
Abstract
The contribution of this work is an approach for lightweight specification and verification of nesC
implementations of sensor networks security protocols. Our approach provides annotations to specify
objectives, network topology, intruder models, and channel fault models. The objectives of the protocols can
be specified in terms of user-defined events, which is significantly more expressive compared to earlier
approaches such as CAPSL that provide a fixed set of objectives. Moreover, our approach is extensible in that
it allows new intruder and channel fault models to be added to the verification process. These models are
themselves written in nesC. To show the feasibility of our approach, we describe the implementation of our
verification framework. Our verification framework uses the model checker SPIN as the underlying
technology. Our approach was able to detect earlier known bugs in protocols and an assumption violation in
the protocol implementation.
Disciplines
Programming Languages and Compilers | Theory and Algorithms
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports/250
Technical Report 06-31, Dept. of Computer Science, Iowa State University, First Version: Oct 12, 2006, Revised: Nov 14, 2006
Lightweight Specification Language and Verification Framework
for Sensor Network Security Protocols
Youssef Hanna
Iowa State University
ywhanna@iastate.edu
Hridesh Rajan
Iowa State University
hridesh@iastate.edu
Wensheng Zhang
Iowa State University
wzhang@iastate.edu
Abstract
The contribution of this work is an approach for lightweight specifi-
cation and verification of nesC implementations of sensor networks
security protocols. Our approach provides annotations to specify
objectives, network topology, intruder models, and channel fault
models. The objectives of the protocols can be specified in terms
of user-defined events, which is significantly more expressive com-
pared to earlier approaches such as CAPSL that provide a fixed set
of objectives. Moreover, our approach is extensible in that it allows
new intruder and channel fault models to be added to the verifi-
cation process. These models are themselves written in nesC. To
show the feasibility of our approach, we describe the implemen-
tation of our verification framework. Our verification framework
uses the model checker SPIN as the underlying technology. Our
approach was able to detect earlier known bugs in protocols and an
assumption violation in the protocol implementation.
1. Introduction
Flaws in security protocols are subtle and hard to find [46, 9].
Finding flaws in the security protocols for sensor networks is even
harder because they operate under fundamentally different system
design assumptions such as event-driven [14] vs. imperative or
message passing, resource and bandwidth constraints, hostile de-
ployment scenarios, trivial physical capturing due to the lack of
tamper resistance, group-oriented behavior, ad hoc and dynamic
topologies, open-ended nature, etc. These assumptions lead to com-
plex protocols, which in turn makes them much harder to verify.
To address this issue, in this work we present a lightweight spec-
ification language and a verification framework tailored for sensor
network security protocols implemented in the nesC language [14],
the dominant language for this paradigm. Our verification frame-
work automatically extracts the PROMELA model [15, 16] of the
subject protocol from the source code annotated with specifica-
tions. This model is verified against the properties specified in an
extended form of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula [41] using
the SPIN model checker [15, 16]. Finally, the verification results
are mapped back to the implementation domain.
Our approach has two features that allow the user to guide the
model generation thereby limiting the state space generated for ver-
ification. It allows a user to add a new channel fault model and an
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
intruder model to the verification process. These user-defined in-
truder models may more closely reflect the attack scenarios specific
to the subject protocol thereby reducing the search space signifi-
cantly. Our approach also allows properties to be specified in terms
of commands and events declared in the protocol, using which a
developer can easily model specific properties such as SECRET,
PRECEDES, etc, in CAPSL-like specification languages [31].
Outline: Section 2 motivates this work. Section 3 briefly describes
the nesC language. A basic familiarity with an imperative program-
ming language such as C is assumed. Section 4 describes the key
constructs of our specification language in detail. Section 5 shows
example extensions of our verification framework to include more
intruders and channel models. Section 6 describes specification lan-
guage constructs to add non-deterministic behavior to intruder and
channel models. Section 7 describes our model extraction method-
ology and our verification framework. Section 8 describes the ver-
ification process. Section 9 discusses the related works. Section 10
describes some limitations of our approach and section 11 con-
cludes.
2. Motivation
Every significant innovation in computer and network systems
often introduces new cryptographic failure modes. These failure
modes are frequently the result of changed assumptions about the
system, its environment, and the client organization. Discovery of
the new failure modes fuel the design of new kinds of cryptographic
protocols, which in turn leads to the invention and refinement of
new verification mechanisms.
For standalone computers, perhaps the only cryptographic fail-
ure mode was malicious access to un-authorized information by
supplying forged authentication information or physical access to
a system. The cryptographic protocols for this era dealt with issues
like password encryption, protection of password files during stor-
age and retrieval, etc.
The advent of networking introduced another failure mode, ac-
cess to un-authorized information on a computer by another com-
puter or principal remotely accessing the computer. As a result,
cryptographic protocols based on a central authentication server be-
gan to emerge [34]. Massively networked distributed systems and
the Internet made the server a bottleneck, resulting in the emer-
gence of decentralized mechanisms such as Needham-Schroeder
protocol [35].
2.1 New Failure Modes in Sensor Networks
A sensor network is a collection of small size, low power, low-
cost sensor nodes that has some computational, communication and
storage capacity. These nodes can operate unattended, sensing and
recording detailed information about their surroundings. The inno-
vation in wireless networking coupled with the effect of Moore’s
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law is making these networks attractive for many civil and military
applications [4] such as target tracking, remote surveillance, and
habitat monitoring.
Like their precursors, sensor network systems also introduce
new cryptographic failure modes to system design. For example,
their lack of tamper resistance makes physical capturing trivial.
The low power, communication and storage capacity render inten-
sive cryptographic protocols unusable. The operating environments
for sensor networks are often hostile, requiring mechanisms for se-
cure communication. In particular, messages containing missions
or queries disseminated by administrators [17], control or data mes-
sages for decentralized collaborations, etc, need to be secure.
2.2 New Security Protocols Emerging
The security research community has risen to the challenge to ad-
dress the new cryptographic failure modes in the sensor networks.
A number of security protocols for sensor networks have been pro-
posed in the past decade. Perrig et al. [40], Eschenauer and Gligor
[13], Liu and Ning [24], and Zhu et al. [52] proposed schemes
for pairwise key establishment; Perrig et al. [40], Ye et al. [51],
and Yang et al. [50] proposed schemes for message authentication;
Przydatek et al. [42] proposed secure data aggregation scheme.
2.3 Security Flaws Hard to Find
Flaws in security protocols are subtle and very hard to find. In
the past, even widely-studied cryptographic protocols are shown
to have faults that are detected much later. For example, Meadows
[29] showed flaws in selective broadcast protocol by Simmons [46].
Burrows et al. [9] showed faults in the directory authentication
framework [1]. Simmons [46] showed that replay of messages can
be used to trick an authentication protocol.
Finding flaws in the security protocols for sensor networks is
even harder. The security protocols for sensor networks protect
against more cryptographic failure modes compared to their coun-
terparts. For example, traditional cryptographic protocols assume
that the nodes cannot be physically captured; however, capturing
sensor nodes is trivial due to the lack of tamper resistance and hos-
tile deployment scenarios. Traditional cryptographic protocols do
not have to worry about nodes running out of power, low compu-
tational and bandwidth overhead, dynamic and ad hoc topologies,
etc. In order to be usable for sensor networks, security protocols
do have to consider these constraints. In addition, security objec-
tives are often assigned to groups instead of individual nodes. As a
result, these protocols are often more complex making their verifi-
cation challenging.
2.4 Current Specification Languages Inadequate
Existing specification and verification techniques are inadequate to
address these new verification challenges. A major issue is the gap
between specification and implementation languages. Most secu-
rity protocols in sensor networks are designed to work in an event-
driven paradigm, whereas existing specification languages are ei-
ther imperative or use a message passing style. This impedance
mismatch between specification and implementation often leads to
missing assumptions, which often translates to bugs in protocol im-
plementations. In this work, instead of requiring a separate specifi-
cation, we extract a model of the protocol from its implementation
for verification purposes.
3. The NesC programming Language
NesC [14] is an extension of the C language designed to develop
the sensor network applications. NesC applications have three ma-
jor building blocks: modules, interfaces and configurations. NesC
modules are similar to early Ada and ML modules in that they can-
not be instantiated, but they serve as containers. A module can con-
tain state declaration (shared by other elements of the modules),
command declaration (methods) and event handlers. An event han-
dler is similar to a method; yet, it is executed only when the event is
triggered. An interface is a collection of related commands/events.
A module that provides an interface has to implement its com-
mands, while a module that uses an interface has to implement its
events.
1 module CompM {
2 provides interface StdControl;
3 uses interface Timer;
4 }
5 implementation {
6 command result_t StdControl.init() {...}
7 event result_t Timer.fired() {...}
8 }
9 configuration Comp {
10 }
11 Implementation {
12 components Main, CompM, SingleTimer;
13 Main.StdControl -> CompM.StdControl;
14 CompM.Timer -> SingleTimer.Timer;
15 ...
16 }
Figure 1. A NesC Example
An example module in NesC is shown in Figure 1. Module
CompM provides interface StdControl, so it has to implement
the interface commands (i.e. StdControl.init()). CompM
also uses the interface Timer, so it has to implement its events (i.e.
Timer.fired). A configuration component is responsible for
connecting (wiring) the components that are using interfaces to the
components that provide their implementation. For example, com-
ponent Main is using interface StdControl and is wired to com-
ponent CompM that provides the implementation for StdControl
comands. Every application has a single top-level configuration.
4. Lightweight Specification Language
Our specification language adds a small set of annotations to be
able to guide the verification process. In this section, we will de-
scribe these annotations in detail. To describe our specification lan-
guage, we show the annotated specification of Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol [35] written in nesC. The example selected
is simple enough to be able to demonstrate the language features
without bogging down the reader with details of the protocol.
Needham-Schroeder protocol is described in the next subsection.
4.1 Example Protocol: Needham-Schroeder
The objective of this protocol is to exchange two secret numbers
between two principals. Figure 2 shows the sequence of messages
in this protocol. Principal A encrypts its randomly generated secret
number called Nonce Na and its name using the public key of B,
so only B can decrypt it using its own private key. After receiving
and decrypting the message, principal B encrypts its Nonce Nb
and its partner nonce Na using A’s public key and sends it back to
A. Principal A decrypts the message, receives the partner’s nonce,
encrypts it and sends it back to B. The two principals now share the
nonces Na and Nb.
Msg1 . A −> B : {Na ,A}pubkB
Msg2 . B −> A : {Na ,Nb}pubkA
Msg3 . A −> B : {Nb} pubkB
Figure 2. Needham-Schroeder Protocol
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4.2 Topology
The first task is to decide upon the network topology for protocol
verification. Our language provides annotations for this task. The
network topology could also be specified as a command line option
for the framework, or as a configuration file; however, neither of
these options make this knowledge explicit as part of the protocol
implementation itself.
1 /*@
2 * __nodes__: 2;
3 *
4 * __reachable__:0 <-> 1;
5 *
6 @*/
7 configuration Needham {
8 ...
9 }
Figure 3. Test Topology for Needham-Schroeder Protocol
Figure 3 shows an example topology specification. The anno-
tation comments start and end with an at-sign (@) similar to the
annotation comments for the JML specification [22]. The number
of nodes involved in the protocol is specified by the special word
nodes (Line 2). These special words are not keywords; they
only have special meanings in this context. In this example, the
network is composed of 2 nodes. Next, the network connectivity
in the topology is specified by the special word reachable
(Line 4). The network topology in this example specifies the bi-
directional connection between node 0 and node 1. An alternative
uni-directional topology could also be 0 -> 1, which would mean
that 1 is reachable from 0 but not the other way around.
For ease of topology specification, we provide some syntactic
sugars, allow use of wildcards, and provide facilities to group a
number of nodes. For example, 0 –> * would mean that any node
in the network is reachable from the node 0 and 0 –> {2,5,8}
would mean that nodes 2, 5 and 8 are reachable from the node
0. Such topologies are commonly known as the star. To show a
communication path in the network, a group of nodes can also be
chained. For example, 0 –> 1 –> 2 would mean that node 1 is
reachable from node 0, node 2 is reachable from node 1. The ring
(or circular) topologies such as 0 –> 1 –> 2 –> 0 are also allowed.
The concrete syntax of topologies will be discussed later in this
section.
To start the verification process, topology specification is suf-
ficient. Figure 4 shows the resulting trace of the verification pro-
cess, where the input to the verification framework was the imple-
mentation of the Needham-Schroeder protocol annotated with the
topology information shown in Figure 3. The figure shows the suc-
cessful execution of the protocol implementation and the resulting
message exchange between the principals. To keep the verification
state space minimal, we recommend starting with a small number
of nodes and gradually scaling up the verification process.
4.3 Channel Specification in Topologies
The topology specification in Figure 3 although instructive from a
pedagogical perspective is not very interesting from the verification
perspective until faults are introduced in the topology. Simplest
types of faults in a network configuration are due to unreliable
communication mediums (channels).
Figure 5 introduces a simple faulty channel Sink between node
0 and node 1. This topology can be read as node 1 is reachable from
node 0 via channel Sink and vice-versa. As the name implies,
this channel simply drops all messages from the recipients. Other
channel models are also defined. Moreover, as we will discuss
later users may themselves define a new channel type for use in
their specifications. The compiler throws a syntactic error, if an
Figure 4. Trace Generated after Adding Topology. (Details elided)
1 /*@
2 * __nodes__: 2;
3 *
4 * __reachable__:0 <-> 1/Sink;
5 *
6 @*/
7 configuration Needham {
8 ...
9 }
Figure 5. Introducing Faulty Channels in a Test Topology
Figure 6. Test Trace Generated after Topology Modification:
shows that protocol cannot make progress in this case.(Details
elided)
undefined channel model is used. After modifying the topology,
the user can run the verification process again to get the resulting
trace as shown in Figure 6, which shows that the protocol cannot
make progress in this case.
4.4 Intruder Specification in Topologies
Another component of the topology specification is the description
of intruder models, sometimes also called attack models. Three
types of intruder models can be defined: promiscuous intruders,
impersonators, and insiders. A promiscuous intruder is not visible
to the legitimate nodes in the network. They silently gather private
data by listening to communication between other nodes. In a
wireless network such as sensor networks, promiscuous intruder-
based attacks are prevalent. An impersonator, also called man-in-
the-middle attack, pretends to be a legitimate node in the network to
communicate with other nodes with the overall objective to gather
secret. An insider, as the name implies, is a legitimate participant
of the network that is compromised to be hostile. The small form
factor and the deployment scenarios for sensor networks make such
attacks easier in comparison to traditional systems.
The presence of a promiscuous intruder in the topology is spec-
ified in the same way as the faulty channel. For example, a simple
predefined promiscuous intruder type is Store. As the name sug-
gests, this intruder keeps a log of the messages transmitted between
principals for offline or online analysis to derive attack patterns and
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for replay attacks. The channel model Sink in Figure 5 can be re-
placed to insert this intruder into the topology in just a simple edit
to change line 4 to reachable :0 < − > 1/Store.
1 /*@
2 * __nodes__: 4;
3 *
4 * __reachable__:0 <-> {1,4};
5 *
6 * __intruder__: 0 <-2-> 1/ManInMiddle;
7 *
8 * __intruder__: 4/DenialOfService;
9 *
10 @*/
11 configuration Needham {
12 ...
13 }
Figure 7. Introducing Impersonators and Insiders
An impersonator can be included in the system using another
visually intuitive notation as shown on line 6 in Figure 7. The no-
tation shows that the node 2 is impersonating node 0 to commu-
nicate with node 1. The type of impersonator is specified to be a
pre-defined intruder type ManInMiddle.
An insider is a legitimate node in the network that is com-
promised. It is therefore essential to specify connectivity to the
insider intruder. In Figure 7, line 4 shows that node 0 is con-
nected with node 1 and node 4. Furthermore, line 8 shows that
node 4 is compromised to emulate a pre-defined intruder type
DenialOfService.
Similar to channel types, users may themselves define new
intruder types for use in their verification process and the use of an
undefined intruder type is illegal. The concrete BNF grammar for
topologies is shown in Figure 8. The productions in the grammar
are self-explanatory.
4.5 Objectives
Figure 9 shows the syntax of objectives in our approach. An objec-
tive specification starts with the special word objective followed
by a colon followed by an objective expression. An expression can
be a literal, or a negated expression (! expression), enclosed in
parenthesis, or an expression preceded by [] or <>, which denotes
the temporal conditions always and eventually. An expression may
also consist of two sub-expressions combined by logical and (&&),
logical or (||), implication (− >), or equivalence (< − >) opera-
tors. These operators have similar meanings as their LTL counter-
parts and they are translated accordingly. Finally, a literal can be
true, false or a user-defined condition.
The user-defined conditions are especially interesting as they
allow objectives to be expressed in terms of commands and
events in the protocol implementation. For example, assume that
the sender SensorS in a given protocol declares a command
snd that takes a parameter of type TOS Msg and the receiver
SensorR in the same protocol registers an event handler of
type rcvd with the underlying network layer that also receives
a parameter of type TOS Msg. The type TOS Msg is a standard
structure for sending and receiving messages available to NesC
programs. A trivial property of this implementation can be ex-
pressed as the user-defined condition SensorS.snd (TOS Msg
m)-> <>SensorR.rcvdMsg(TOS Msg m), which means
that SensorS sending a message m implies that SensorR will
receive the same message m eventually. This objective does not ac-
count for problems in message transmission, but it can be easily
augmented to do so.
Let us now consider the objectives of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol. The primary objective of this protocol is that two nodes
〈topology〉 ::= 〈numNodes〉 〈opt− reachability〉
〈opt− intruder〉
〈numNodes〉 ::= nodes : 〈posint〉
〈reachability〉 ::= reachable : 〈rexpressions〉
〈rexpressions〉 ::= 〈rexpressions〉, 〈rexpression〉
〈rexpression〉
〈rexpression〉 ::= 〈posint〉 〈rop〉 〈posint〉 〈opt− chanModel〉
〈posint〉 〈rop〉 〈posint〉 〈opt− intrModel〉
〈rop〉 ::= < −− >
−− >
< −−
< − 〈posint〉 − >
− 〈posint〉 − >
< − 〈posint〉 −
〈chanModel〉 ::= /c, c ∈ Set of defined channel models
〈intrModel〉 ::= /in, in ∈ Set of defined intruder models
〈intruder〉 ::= intruder : 〈iexpressions〉
〈iexpressions〉 ::= 〈iexpressions〉, 〈iexpression〉
〈iexpression〉
〈iexpression〉 ::= 〈posint〉 / 〈intrModel〉
〈posint〉 ::= p, p ∈ Set of positive integers
Figure 8. Syntax of Topologies
〈objective〉 ::= objective : 〈oexpression〉
〈oexpression〉 ::= 〈literal〉
| ! 〈oexpression〉
| ( 〈oexpression〉 )
| [] 〈oexpression〉
| <> 〈oexpression〉
| 〈oexpression〉 && 〈oexpression〉
| 〈oexpression〉 || 〈oexpression〉
| 〈oexpression〉 − > 〈oexpression〉
| 〈oexpression〉 < − > 〈oexpression〉
〈literal〉 ::= true | false | 〈condition〉
〈condition〉 ::= 〈int〉 . 〈qid〉 (〈params〉 )
〈qid〉 ::= 〈qid〉 . 〈id〉
〈id〉
〈params〉 ::= 〈params〉, 〈param〉
〈param〉
〈param〉 ::= 〈type〉 〈id〉
Figure 9. Syntax of Objectives
1 /*@
2 * __nodes__: 3;
3 *
4 * __reachable__:0 <-> 1;
5 *
6 * __intruder__: 0 <-2-> 1/ManInMiddle;
7 *
8 * __objective__: (0.finalState(Nonce n)
9 * ->1.finalState(Nonce n))
10 * && !(2.knows(Nonce n));
11 *
12 @*/
13 configuration Needham {
14 ...
15 }
Figure 10. Introducing Impersonators and Insiders
should share a common nonce for communication. The security ob-
jective of this protocol is that any other node (including intruders)
in the system may not know this nonce. If the protocol implemen-
tation is slightly modified to throw an event finalState with a
parameter n of type Nonce, when the communicating principals
believe that the final state is reached, these objectives can be ex-
pressed in terms of these user-defined events as shown in Figure 10
(lines 8-10). Here the intruder type throws an event knows with
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Figure 11. Test Trace Generated after Adding Objectives: Circled
State Denotes Objective Violation. (Details elided)
a parameter of type Nonce, if it is able to guess a Nonce. Using
the same parameter name n in all three parts of the objective ex-
presses the intent that all three nonce are the same. After adding
this objective, the user can run the verification process again to get
the resulting trace as shown in Figure 11, which shows that the pro-
tocol violates the objective and the message sequence that leads to
the violation.
5. Extending the Verification Framework
In this section, we discuss two extension mechanisms provided by
our verification framework for including user-defined channel fault
models and intruder models.
5.1 Adding New Channel Fault Models
Our verification framework provides a set of primitives to add
new channel models. Channel models are used to specify the
topology of the network. They are written as separate nesC ap-
plications and saved in a library. Figure 12 shows an example of
a lossy channel model Sink. The module Sink has one state
that is annotated with our new annotation comments. The special
word intercepted declares that this state of type TOS Msg
(structure representing message in nesC applications) is the mes-
sage being sent through the channel. In other words, it is a hint to
the verification framework that when this channel model is used,
the variable message should be initialized with the message be-
ing transmitted. The rest of the module simply does nothing, which
means that the channel does not forward the message. Note that
the channel application is meaningless if treated as an independent
application.
1 module SinkM {...}
2 implementation {
3 /*@ __intercepted__ @*/
4 struct TOS_Msg message;
5 ...
6 }
Figure 12. An Example Channel Model
More intelligent channel fault models can be written that may
modify the message during transmission arbitrarily. For example,
Figure 13 implements a channel that drops half of the transmitted
messages. The command start in this module maintains an alter-
nating flag and forwards the message when the flag is set to 1 and
drops it otherwise.
1 module LossyChannel {...}
2 implementation {
3 /*@ __intercepted__ @*/
4 struct TOS_Msg _msg;
5 int flag;
6 command result_t StdControl.init() { flag = 0; ...}
7 command result_t StdControl.start() {
8 IntMsg* msg = (IntMsg *) _msg.data;
9 call CommControl.start();
10 if (flag == 1) { /* Forward the message */
11 call Send.send(msg->dest, sizeof(IntMsg), &_msg);
12 flag = 0;
13 }
14 else flag = 1; /* Drop the message */
15 return SUCCESS;
16 }
17 ...
18 }
Figure 13. Emulating 50% probability of Message Loss
5.2 Adding New Intruder Models
Similar to channel models, intruder models are written as separate
nesC applications and can be saved in a library for reuse. Three dif-
ferent intruder types are modeled differently. The promiscuous in-
truder type is modeled similar to the channel models, but it always
forwards the messages it receives. An example of the impersonator
intruder type is shown in Figure 14. In the declaration of states, the
special word role (line 10) specifies that when the intruder
is used by the verification framework, the state AName (line 11)
should be initialized with the name of the impersonated node. Sim-
ilarly, target (line 12) specifies that the state BName (line
13) is the node to communicate with. name (line 14) speci-
fies that intruderName is the name of the intruder node. The
event handler ReceiveMsg.Receive is responsible for receiv-
ing messages.
1 module ManInMiddle {...}
2 implementation {
3 /*@ __role__ @*/
4 int AName;
5 /*@ __target__ @*/
6 int BName;
7 /*@ __name__ @*/
8 int intruderName;
9 ...
10 event TOS_MsgPtr ReceiveMsg.receive(TOS_MsgPtr msgR) {...}
11 }
Figure 14. Example Intruder: ManInMiddle
In Figure 7, this intruder model was used as intruder :
0 < −2− > 1/ManInMiddle. In this context, AName will be
equal to 0, BName will be equal to 1, and intruderName will be
equal to 2.
6. Specifying Non-Determinism
In order to expose errors in security protocols, one should be able to
generate and analyze various possible combinations (models) of in-
teractions between the intruder nodes, channels, and genuine nodes
running the protocol. However, additional mechanisms should be
provided to keep the state space of these models tractable. Our ver-
ification framework utilizes state-based model checking as the un-
derlying technology. State space explosion is a well-known prob-
lem in a state-based model checking techniques such as SPIN.
Although SPIN uses abstraction and partial-order reduction tech-
niques [39] to mitigate the effects of state space explosion, scala-
5 2006/12/11
bility is still an issue for complex models, if care is not exercised in
constructing them.
6.1 Message Templates
Our approach provides constructs to specify limited non-determinism
in intruder and channel models. The first such construct is message
template. A message template is an annotated structure used to
specify range of values taken by the members of the structure. An
example message template is shown in Figure 15. In this message
template, the members of the structure IntMsg are annotated with
their respective ranges. For example, let us assume a verification
scenario where the network topology consists of four nodes and
impersonator’s node id is 4. In this scenario, we can safely assume
that all messages that an impersonator might generate will always
have the source and destination address between 0 and 3. This re-
striction is specified by annotating the structure member src and
dest using the special word range .
1 typedef struct IntMsg {
2 ...
3 /*@ __range__: 0-3 @*/
4 int src;
5 /*@ __range__: 0-3 @*/
6 int dest;
7 ...
8 } IntMsg;
Figure 15. Declaring Message Templates
Now, let us suppose that we want to add an intruder model
that produces a random response to any message that it receives,
hoping to find and exploit a flaw in the subject protocol. Such
an intruder is shown in Figure 16. In this example, line 5 shows
that the local variable msg is annotated with the special word
usetemplate . When this intruder model is translated to the
PROMELA code, our verifying compiler automatically expands it
to try all possible messages that conform to the message template
non-deterministically. We advise to use message templates with
caution. If message templates are not designed carefully, the state-
space of the model can quickly become unwieldy.
1 event TOS_MsgPtr ReceiveMsg.receive(TOS_MsgPtr msgR) {
2 /@ __usetemplate__ @/
3 IntMsg msg;
4 call Send.send(msg.dest, sizeof(IntMsg), msg);
5 }
Figure 16. Using Message Templates
6.2 Parameterized Message Templates
In practice, intruders may use a variety of message templates in
different situations. Our message templates can also be parameter-
ized to suit that need. An example parameterized message template
is shown in Figure 17. The parameterized message template is de-
clared by annotating the structure definition as shown on line 1.
The syntax is inspired from the common syntax for generics. A
parameterized message template can have zero or more parame-
ters (message template being the special case, when the number
of parameters is zero). The parameter selector here is used to
select appropriate ranges for the structure member src in a form
similar to switch-case statements. The label default is optional. An
example usage of the parameterized message templates is shown in
Figure 18 that selects values in two different ranges for src.
1 typedef struct IntMsg /*@ <selector> @*/{
2 ...
3 /*@ case (selector == 1) __range__: 2-3;
4 * case (selector == 2) __range__: 1,3;
5 * default __range__: 1-2 @*/
6 int src;
7 ...
8 } IntMsg;
Figure 17. Declaring Parameterized Message Template
1 event TOS_MsgPtr ReceiveMsg.receive(TOS_MsgPtr msgR) {
2 /@ __usetemplate__: 1 @/
3 IntMsg msg;
4 call Send.send(msg.dest, sizeof(IntMsg), msg);
5 }
Figure 18. Using Parameterized Message Templates
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6.3 Non-Deterministic Selection of Commands and Events
The channel fault model and intruder model implementations are
allowed to declare one or more commands and event handlers
with same signature. When there are multiple commands (event
handlers) with exactly same signature, a non-deterministic choice
is made to pick one command (event handler) for execution.
7. Verification Framework
Figure 19 shows the components of our framework. The annotated
implementation, the intruder models and the channel models are
given as inputs to the model extractor. The model extractor gener-
ates a PROMELA model from the input files. The model is then
given as input to the SPIN model checker, which verifies whether
the model violates the objectives which have been translated into
LTL formulas. If the objectives are satisfied, the protocol is veri-
fied as secure. Otherwise, SPIN produces a counter example that
violates the security objectives. This counter example is then trans-
lated to a sequence of nesC statements. The protocol verification
may not terminate if the PROMELA model is too large. We de-
scribe construction of PROMELA model from protocol implemen-
tation, channel models, intruder models and objectives below.
7.1 Translation of Protocols
A protocol as a whole is translated into one PROMELA process
that is a global object describing the behaviors of the protocol. For
each principal (node) involved in the protocol, an instance of the
process is instantiated and run.
Events are translated into synchronous global message chan-
nels. When an event is signaled, a message is placed on the cor-
responding channel of the corresponding node. Event handlers are
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translated into loops having as the guard statement a receive mes-
sage statement that listens to the channel. This statement is not ex-
ecutable unless some item is placed on the channel, so the code for
the event handlers is not executed unless the event is signaled.
7.2 Translation of Channel Models
If a channel is normal, the code for transmitting messages via the
channel will be translated into PROMELA. However, if the channel
is labeled as some faulty model (e.g., Sink, ManInMiddle, etc.),
the code for describing the behaviors of the corresponding faulty
model will be translated. For the example shown in Figure 5. The
channel connecting node 0 and node 1 is a sink. Therefore, when
that channel is translated, no code will be generated since a sink
channel does not forward any message.
7.2.1 Translation of Intruder Models
Each intruder model is translated into a separate process that de-
scribes the behaviors of the intruder according to the nesC code for
the intruder model. The translation is performed in the same way
as for a normal protocol.
7.2.2 Translation of Objectives
Since objectives are represented using command calls/ event sig-
nals, an array of type bool and of size n is initialized to false for
every command/event, where n is the number of nodes involved
in the protocol. When a node calls a command, the element in the
corresponding array is set to true. As for the objective itself, it is
translated into a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula.
7.2.3 Model Checking
Once translated into PROMELA model, the protocol is verified
against the objectives using the SPIN model checker. If the objec-
tives are not satisfied, SPIN produces a counterexample that vio-
lates the objective. This counterexample is then translated into a
sequence of statements in the protocol that violated the security
objective.
8. Evaluation
In this section, we describe the results of applying our approach on
several protocol. For sanity check, we first applied our verification
process to the Needham-Schroeder protocol. Even though, this
protocol is not designed for sensor networks, it provided a good
initial test case.
8.1 Verification of Needham-Schroeder Protocol
Needham-Schroeder protocol has a known flaw. If a malicious node
I communicating with node A impersonates A and establish a con-
nection with another node B, B will believe that it is communi-
cating with A and will share its secret key with A. The malicious
node I will become aware of this secret key. This violates the pro-
tocol objective the secret numbers should be only known to the two
nodes.
We verified a nesC implementation of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol. Our framework successfully detected and reported the
flaw in the protocol. Figure 20 shows the counterexample that vio-
lates the protocol objectives in terms of sequence of statements of
the protocol. Lines 1, 2 and 3 show that there are three nodes in the
network and an intruder node. Line 9 shows that the secret num-
ber of node 2 (node B) is revealed to the intruder. The verification
of this protocol requires around 7 MB memory, generates around
700K states out of which around 317K states are matched by SPIN.
The depth of the generated state space is around 9000. The time
taken to verify this protocol is less than a second on a Dell Pow-
erEdge 1850 with dual 3.8 GHz processors and 2 GB RAM.
1 NeedhamM.nc.line 15: call Sensor.init()
2 NeedhamM.nc.line 15: call Sensor.init()
3 NeedhamM.nc.line 15: call Sensor.init()
4 SensorM.nc.line 64: call Send.send(...)
5 Intruder1M.nc.line 54: ...
6 SensorM.nc.line 124: call Send.send(...)
7 Intruder1M.nc.line 75: ...
8 // Nonce of node B revealed to intruder
9 Intruder1M.nc.line 76: NonceB = ...
Figure 20. Flaw Detection in Needham-Schroeder Protocol
8.2 Verification of the One-way Key Chain Based One-hop
Broadcast Authentication Scheme
The one-way key chain based one-hop broadcast authentication
scheme was proposed by Zhu et al. [52]. In this scheme, every node
(denoted as A) generates a one-way key chain of certain length;
that is, kn, kn−1 = h(kn) , · · · , k1 = hn−1(kn), k0 = hn(kn),
where h(.) is a secure hash function. Then, A transmits the first key
of the key chain (i.e., k0) to each neighbor separately, encrypted
with the pairwise key shared between A and this neighbor. When
A broadcasts its first message m0, the message is authenticated
with k1; that is,m0 is broadcast with message authentication code
(MAC) h(m0, k1). After the broadcast, k1 is released alone or with
the next broadcast message, which is authenticated with the next
key in the key chain (i.e., k2). To generalize, the i-th message mi
is broadcast along with h(mi, ki+1), and ki+1 is released after the
broadcast.
One known attack [52] to the above scheme is as follows: First,
the adversary prevents a neighbor of A (denoted as B) from re-
ceiving the packet from A directly. This can be achieved by, for
example, transmitting to B at the same time when A is transmit-
ting messagemi and when A is releasing authentication key ki+1.
Second, the adversary sends a modified packet to B while imper-
sonating A. Note that, the adversary has already got the released
authentication key before transmitting the modified message to B,
hence B will not detect the fabrication and will accept the modified
packet. To defend against an outsider (not a neighbor of A) from
launching the above attack, the original authentication scheme can
be enhanced as follows: A shares a cluster key KC with all its
neighbors; when A broadcasts message mi, the MAC of the mes-
sage will be h(mi, ki+1XORKC). However, the defense will not
be useful if the adversary has compromised A and therefore has
obtainedKC [52]. Our approach was able to detect this attack.
8.3 Verification of the Polynomial Based Pairwise Key
Establishment Protocol
The polynomial based pairwise key establishment protocol [24]
includes two phases: system initialization before network deploy-
ment and pairwise key establishment after deployment. Before de-
ployment, the network controller picks n symmetric bivariate poly-
nomials fi(x, y) (i = 0, · · · , n − 1); every sensor node with ID
A is preloaded with m < n univariate polynomials fik (A, y)
(k = 0, · · · ,m−1), which are shares ofm out of n aforementioned
bivariate polynomials. After deployment, if neighboring nodes A
and B have shares derived from the same bivariate polynomial,
for example, f0(A, y) and f0(B, y), they can directly establish
fi(A,B) = fi(B,A) as their pairwise key. Otherwise, A and B
will find one or more helping nodes I1, I2, · · · , Is such that, each
pair of adjacent nodes on the chain A, I1, I2, · · · , Is have shares
derived from the same bivariate polynomial, and thus can set up a
pairwise key. Then, A picks a new key, encrypts it with the pairwise
key shared with I1, and sends it to I1. I1 and the following nodes
in the chain uses the same approach to secretly transmit the new
key hop-by-hop towards B. This way, a pairwise key can be estab-
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Figure 21. Assumption Violation in µTESLA Implementation
lished between A and B. However, the pairwise key between A and
B is not exclusively shared by A and B, but is exposed to every in-
termediate nodes (I0, · · · , Is) in the chain. This leads to a flaw of
the protocol: if any of the intermediate nodes is compromised, the
pairwise key between A and B will be disclosed.
We wrote a simplified version of the protocol, where every
node is initialized with two bivariate polynomials (i.e. node A has
f1(A, y) and f2(A, y), node B has f2(B, y) and f3(B, y), and
node C has f3(C, y) and f4(C, y)) so node A can establish a
key directly with node B using f2(A,B), node B and establish
a key directly with node C using f3(B,C). However, node A
cannot establish a key directly with node C (no shared bivariate
polynomial), thus it has to go through the intermediate node B.
The intruder model for intermediate nodes signals the event
Intruder.knowSecret(secretOfAandB) when it sends
the secret code to the two nodes that want to establish a pairwise
key.
8.4 Verification of the µTESLA protocol
µTESLA [40] was proposed for securing broadcast in sensor net-
works. This protocol assumes a network model that consists of a
broadcast sender (e.g., base station) and multiple receivers (e.g.,
ordinary sensor nodes). On receiving a broadcast message, each re-
ceiver needs to verify whether the message is really from the sender
and not tampered by any intermediate nodes. The correct working
of the protocol relies on the assumption that all principals (base
station and ordinary sensor nodes) are loosely time synchronized.
However, the description of the protocol does not specify what time
synchronization protocol should be applied or what properties the
time synchronization protocol should have. The lack of rigorous
treatment of the fundamental assumption may not pose a problem
to an network security expert, but it may lead to unexpected mis-
implementation if the implementer does not fully understand the
protocol. For example, the implementer may choose to implement
a simple but not secure time synchronization protocol as the funda-
tion of the µTESLA protocol since the µTESLA does not have
clear specification for the time synchronization protocol.
Figure 21 illustrates the counter example trace. For time syn-
chronization, node A sends out its time stamp t0, which is inter-
cepted by some malicious node I. Node I changes the time stamp
to be t0, and then forwards it to nodes B. Since the time synchro-
nization protocol is attacked, the clock in node B will not get syn-
chronized with node A. Later, when node A broadcasts message
m1 (which is authenticated with key k1) at time t1, the message is
intercepted by node I who will not further forward it. At time t1+1,
when node A releases key k1, the key is also intercepted and held
by node I. Right after that, node I forges a message m1’ authenti-
cated with key k1, and forwards it to B. Then, node I releases key
k1 at t1+2. Upon receiving k1, node B will accept message m1’
since it can be verified with k1 and the time stamp of the message
(i.e., t1) is within the valid scope for acceptance.
9. Related Work
9.1 Specification Languages
Specifications for security protocols range from informal narrations
of message flows to formal assertion of protocol properties [2].
The use of natural language to describe the protocol is easy, but
lacks rigor. It is also difficult to use such specifications as the
basis for reasoning. Other specification techniques such as that
proposed by Needham and Schroeder [35] address some of these
limitations (also see Liebl [23]). In their notation, the protocol
is expressed as a set of messages exchanged between principals.
Abadi and Gordon [2] argue that “these notations have a fairly
clear connection to the intended implementations of the protocols,
but they do not provide a precise and solid basis for reasoning
about the protocols.” They further state that “other notations such
as that by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [9] are more formal, but
their relation to implementations may be more tenuous or subtle.”
There thus seems to be a tradeoff between rigor and intuitiveness in
the notations for protocol specification. Our approach is different
from these approaches in that it is concerned about verifying the
implementations of these protocols and the specifications that are
needed are minimal.
Another challenge in specification is to denote security proper-
ties. A widely used approach is to formulate the security properties
as predicates on the behaviors of the system consisting of a proto-
col and its environment (e.g. Bellare and Rogaway [6], Bodei et al.
[7], Gray and McLean [18], Mitchell et al. [33], Lowe [26], Paul-
son [38], Schneider [44], Woo and Lam [49]). These approaches
are loosely based on Dolev and Yao’s notion of secrecy [12] which
states that a process preserves the secrecy of a piece of data M if
the process never sends M in clear on the network, or anything
that would permit the computation of M, even in interaction with
an attacker. However, based on the observations of McLean [27],
Abadi and Gordon [2] argue that some security properties, such as
non-interference, are not predicates on behaviors.
Language-based approaches generally allow richer specifica-
tion. A number of language-based approaches have also been
used for specification such as Real Time Asynchronous Grammar
(RTAG) [5] based on attribute grammars [21], PRO-GRAM [37]
based on YACC [19], Promela [15] [16] based on Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [41], etc. As far we are aware, these approaches do not
provide a generic mechanism to verify protocol properties, such as
security properties. Our approach is essentially to build a domain-
specific mechanism based on these language-based approaches.
The common authentication protocol specification language
(CAPSL) developed by Millen et al. [31], is closely related. The
motivation for the CAPSL project was that it is difficult to ap-
ply most cryptographic protocol verification mechanisms. They
argued that the reason for this difficulty is that a protocol has to be
re-specified for each verification technique that is applied to it and
translating published description to the input of the verification tool
is difficult [11]. CAPSL project solves this problem by developing
a two-layered language design, where higher-level specification is
translated to the CAPSL intermediate language (CIL). CAPSL al-
lows clear specification of security properties in the style of Dolev
and Yao [12]; however, it is also a message driven specification
language that does not fit the sensor network paradigm very well.
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9.2 Verification Techniques
There is a significant body of research on verifying security proto-
cols but they don’t address challenges of sensor networks security
protcols. The best-known and influential approach based on Modal
logic is that by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [9, 3], commonly
known as the BAN logic. The key idea is to reason about the state
of beliefs among principals in a system. Some extensions to the
BAN logic are also proposed such as by Oorschot [48].
Meadows developed the NRL protocol analyzer for the analysis
of cryptographic protocols [29]. The NRL protocol analyzer was
used to find flaws in a number of cryptographic protocols including
selective broadcast protocol by Simmons [46], Resource Sharing
Protocol by Burns and Mitchell [8], re-authentication protocol by
Neuman and Stubblebine [36], etc. Longley and Rigby also devel-
oped a tool and demonstrated a flaw in a banking security protocol
[25]. Yet another tool was Interrogater developed by Millen et al.
[32]. Kemmerer [20] used general-purpose formal methods tech-
nique as tools to verify cryptographic protocols. Schneider adapted
the CSP model for verification of security protocols [45]. For a de-
tailed summary of verification techniques, please refer to a survey
by Rubin and Honeyman [43], Meadows [28], Gritzalis et al. [47],
and a more recent survey by Buttyan [10].
10. Limitations
The current implementation of our verification framework has
some limitations partly due to the restrictions of the underlying
model-checking technology and due to specific translation ap-
proach that we have taken. A limitation is on the number of par-
ticipant nodes in the verification process. Most implementations
of SPIN only allow a maximum of 255 channels for rendezvous
communication to keep the model finite. Our approach uses chan-
nels to model events and communication between two nodes. The
number of channels thus puts a limitation on the number of nodes
available to the protocol verifier. In future, we plan to eliminate
this limitation by using guarded statements that allow more than
one nodes to share a channel. The second limitation stems from our
approach to model nodes. We model a node as a separate process
in PROMELA. The number of these processes are limited.
In a recent work, Meadows [30] argues that “most of the work
on the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has concentrated
on protocols that involve the communication of a fixed number of
principals: · · · Most data structures are close-ended. · · · The open-
endedness is included in the protocol model, but only with respect
to the number of protocol executions that may be going on at the
same time, · · · . However, open-ended structures are beginning to
show up in a number of different applications. By open-ended,
we simply mean that the structure may include an arbitrary large
number of data fields; either no precise limit is put on them, or
the bound is so large that for the purpose of analysis we may as
well assume that it does not exist. One example of an open-ended
structure is in group communication protocols, in which keys must
be shared among the members of a group of arbitrary size. [30, p.
4–5]”
Most security protocols in sensor networks are open-ended in
the Meadows terminology. In other words they place no bounds on
the principals involved. In the protocol for filtering false messages
proposed by Ye et al. [51], the number of nodes participating in
the source authentication is not limited. In general, in the sensor
networks paradigm, the key concern is the group behavior of the
nodes. The objectives are usually assigned to a group of nodes,
based on locality, type, etc. The behavior of individual nodes is
only as important as to satisfy the group objectives. The individual
nodes may join or leave the group at times: they may be captured,
or may just run out of power. It is therefore necessary to address
this limitation.
11. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we presented our approach for writing lightweight
specifications and automatic verification tailored for sensor net-
work security protocols. Our approach automatically extracts
PROMELA models from nesC implementation of these security
protocols. Annotations are provided to specify network topology,
intruders, faulty channels and protocol objectives. The verification
framework can be extended to include new intruder and channel
models. Our approach also helps fill the impedance mismatch be-
tween message-based specification languages and event-based im-
plementation languages of sensor networks.
Our approach opens up a number of interesting avenues that
we plan to explore in future. One such area is analyzing the influ-
ence of non-functional properties, such as memory, bandwidth, and
power constraint on security properties. Sensor nodes are resource
and bandwidth constrained. It may not be sufficient in this envi-
ronment for a node to have excellent security property at the cost
of depleting the system resources. The fitness of a protocol for a
particular purpose is thus also a function of assumptions about the
execution environment. For example, a key management protocol
may distribute the shares of a key polynomial among n neighbors
so that k fragments are required to reconstruct it. This protocol fails
if either l ≥ k nodes are captured or m ≥ n − k nodes run out of
power. Traditional verification mechanisms only assume lost or in-
tercepted messages as failure modes for security protocols making
them inadequate to handle situations like the loss of power situa-
tion above and the effect of other such non-functional properties on
security properties.
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